MSRP: $34.95 USD
ISBN: 978-1-932033-86-1
Website: www.casematepublishing.com
Review sample supplied by Casemate Publishing Co.

The author, Robin L. Rielly, is well qualified to write on this topic, having an MA in Japanese Area Studies from Seton Hall University, and having written a number of books dealing with the Pacific War. The 23 page bibliography, which includes primary and secondary sources, is the most extensive I have seen in any book of this type. If you want to know anything about this topic, the use of destroyers and other small warships as radar pickets to detect incoming kamikaze attacks against American forces in the Okinawa area, and the coordination of day and night fighters as a defensive force, this is the book to read.

The book is a historical treatment of the Japanese efforts to forestall the American invasion of Japan during the summer of 1945, and explains the Japanese strategy to obstruct the Okinawa invasion and American efforts to counter their actions. To my knowledge, this particular topic has never been examined in detail before, and I certainly learned a lot from reading this book. Profusely illustrated with maps, photographs, and drawings, the subject is covered as completely as possible, with details of the overall events and individual exploits.

The first section deals with the nature of radar picket duty, and how it developed during the course of the Pacific War. The different types of ships are discussed, along with the commanders, especially concentrating on the ships' armament systems. Tactics are explained, such as the positioning of ships for mutual defense, and the locations of the radar pickets to provide an overall defense system against Japanese attack. One of the key ingredients was the CAP, or Combat Air Patrol, which consisted of Navy and Marine F6F's and F4U's, along with Army P-47N's and later, P-61's. The difficulties of coordinating the activities of these aircraft against incoming Japanese aircraft are explained, as these ships were not only vectoring CAP aircraft against intruders but also defending themselves with anti-aircraft weapons.

The Japanese by mid 1945 had come to the conclusion that the only way they could expect to slow the American advance was to use kamikaze tactics against U.S. warships. They were running dangerously short of men, planes, and fuel and many of their skilled maintenance personnel had been bypassed by MacArthur's Island Hopping Strategy, so they were up against the wall in their attempts to save their country from invasion. One effect of this was to close down their flight training programs, freeing additional pilots for kamikaze operations, but their resources were limited, and American attacks by B-29's and B-24's against bases from which the kamikazes operated severely reduced their ability to mount the massed attacks that was their only chance of success. At times, they would have to move their planes out of areas subject to American bombing attacks, ranging as far away as Korea on occasion.

One interesting factor here was that the Japanese Army and Navy finally started acting as allies rather than enemies, and formations of Army and Navy aircraft were regularly encountered by American pilots. Also, there were a number of different operations planned by the Japanese, and American intelligence was aware of all of these. Actually, U.S. codebreaking was a deciding factor in the Japanese failure, as the Americans usually had warning about impending operations. The biggest problem faced by U.S, forces was being overwhelmed by sheer numbers, as the CAP's were often outnumbered. This was mitigated somewhat by the fact that most of the Japanese pilots were poorly trained, and usually unable to defend themselves against the better trained and equipped Americans. One of the major factors in this campaign was the courage and tenacity of the American Navy personnel, surviving long hours of continuous attacks and standing to general quarters, and the stress and fatigue must have reduced the operating efficiency of the ships. American losses in ships and men were high, with 15 ships sunk and 50 damaged to some extent, along with 1,348 killed and 1,586 wounded.

There were no major problems with the book, other than the fact that the author never mentions the reason for the end of the campaign, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the fact that the losses sustained in the Okinawa battles were one of the reasons why President Truman decided to use the atomic bombs in an attempt to get the Japanese to surrender. Also, reference is made to a Japanese aircraft with the code name Nan, and I can find no other reference to the type. Perhaps it came from a Navy report.

If you are interested in this particular phase of World War II, this is a "must have" book. Highly recommended. Thanks to Casemate Publishing and IPMS/USA for the review copy. The book can be obtained from Casemate Publishing, at 610-853-9131 or the company website above.